simply immoral and unjust immediately beg -and have commonly ducked -the question of what, then, we are supposed to do. It would be hard to find examples of either such approach in the current literature. With the demise of communism (in both theory and practice), and widespread recognition that any foreseeable future will involve some version of a market economy, even egalitarians have accommodated themselves to this.
2 A significant number go further, deploying the virtues of the ideal market in their condemnation of its often corrupt realities.
Though I share the concern with feasibility, I am troubled by this turn towards the market; and especially troubled by the claim that there are sound egalitarian reasons for endorsing markets in goods and labour. Endorsements in the name of efficiency already risk invoking an idealised version of 'the market' that bears little relationship to the often failing markets of the real world. Endorsements in the name of equality mostly make it clear that it is market as ideal type, not as actual practice, that is said to promote equality. Yet here, too, the idealising move risks blunting the critique of actual market operations, because of the difficulties in disentangling ideal from real. Features from the operations of actual markets may be mistakenly incorporated into descriptions of the ideal, in ways that pre-empt more radical alternatives; or substantive norms associated with market societies may be written in to what are presented as neutral market 'mechanisms'. From the other side, persistent features of actual markets may be treated as anomalies or irrelevant corruptions, in a manner that recalls distinctions between 'explaining' and 'explaining away'. 3 My suspicion, in other words, is that it is not so much the egalitarian accommodation with markets that is the source of my unease, but the fact that this accommodation so often operates through ideal theory.
In what follows, I start with some illustrations of the turn towards the market in liberal egalitarian political thought, and go on to distinguish three distinct meanings that can be attached to the notion of ideal theory. 4 I have deliberately broadened the term beyond its reference point in John Rawls' distinction between ideal and nonideal theory, for I see the over-emphasis on Rawls' definition as itself an unhelpful narrowing of debate. Within each of the three meanings, I consider ways in which the deployment of ideal theory creates problems in theorising the relationship between equality and the market. My own view, to state it from the outset, is that differences between one kind of market society and another are going to become increasingly important in the development of egalitarian alternatives, and that questions about the compatibility of equality with the market will come to focus more on the substance of market relations than a general principle of market exchange. Specificity matters here. 
Modes of market accommodation
One dominant mode of market accommodation follows a pattern laid out by Rawls, where the theorising is self-consciously ideal, and the market enters as an (also idealised) 'fact' of life that imposes efficiency constraints on distribution. The presumption, derived from ideal considerations, is in favour of an equal distribution of social primary goods, but this is to be modified where an unequal distribution turns out to the advantage of the least advantaged. The modification is itself justified in ideal terms (as what any rational person would choose), but its reference point is clearly market society, including what is taken to be the historically established relationship between competitive markets and economic growth, and the need for both profit and income differentials. Rawls himself explicitly assumes a free market system, while remaining agnostic on the precise role of private ownership. 5 In doing so, he moves between an idealised version of the market (which 'may then be used to appraise existing arrangements' 6 ), and more historically contingent discussion of the relative merits of private property versus socialist regimes. He accepts entirely the efficiency claims made on behalf of a free market system, and regards it as one of the strengths of the difference principle that it makes justice compatible with efficiency.
5 'I assume in all interpretations…that the economy is roughly a free market system, although the means of production may or may not be privately owned. ' John Rawls (1971) It can also be said that Rawls' account of efficiency falsely represents the need for incentives as integral to the workings of a free market, in ways that then place them beyond the scope of justice. In his famous criticism, G A Cohen likens the refusal of the talented to work for anything like the average wage to a kidnapper demanding ransom, and argues that it would be hard to sustain the incentive justification for inequality if the rich had to make their case for it when face-to-face with the poor. 9 It is not, in this analysis, an 'objective fact' about markets that the talented have to be paid more, but something that derives from their own unwillingness, and Cohen argues that there would not be the same 'need' for incentives if the culture shifted in a more just and egalitarian direction. I take it as one implication of this that those who represent the need for incentives as definitionally integral to 'the market' have engaged in false idealisation. In doing so, they commit Some of the feminist writing on prostitution or contracts for surrogate motherhood has followed a similar train of thought, taking issue not with the market per se as with the appropriateness of markets in women's sexual or reproductive labour. 12 In her critique of commercial surrogacy, for example, Elizabeth Anderson avoids the suggestion that the norms of the market are in principle unattractive or antiegalitarian, but focuses on where these norms legitimately apply. 'To say that something is properly regarded as a commodity is to claim that the norms of the market are appropriate for regulating its production, exchange and enjoyment' 13 : this suggests nothing particularly disreputable in market norms. The problem, for
Anderson, arises when these are applied to the way we allocate and understand parental rights and responsibilities or the way we treat women's reproductive labour, for when this happens, 'children are reduced from objects of love to objects of use'
and women 'from subjects of respect and consideration to objects of use'. clear that markets cannot embody relations of equality when people lack equality in bargaining power, and her vision of market society is one where everyone is secured against destitution, and there are laws protecting the rights of tenants against landlords, guaranteeing workers their right to organise into unions, preventing the rich from abusing their wealth to establish social hierarchies, and so on. As already noted, she also thinks the market must be kept firmly in its place, and is opposed to markets in women's reproductive labour or markets in sex. But like Dworkin, she regards the market as an important force for equality -not so much, in her case, for teasing out what people really want or are prepared to pay, but in undermining relations of servility. gender and race. Are we to attribute this to the presence or the absence of markets, to their dominance or incomplete development? Since what is at stake is never pure market versus pure non-market (neither of which exists), it becomes almost impossible to determine whether the many contra-indications reflect the continuing strength of non-market forces or the absurdity of the notion that markets promote equality.
In an earlier paper assessing claims -in this case, mostly by non-egalitariansabout markets eroding partiality and promoting toleration, Iain Hampsher-Monk noted that one of the difficulties in challenging such views was that no amount of empirical evidence about the persistence of discrimination was going to be recognised as decisive. 'The market ideologue is apt to respond to apparent instances of the free market's failure to realize its predicted virtues with the observation that the world must be falling short of the demanding characteristics of the ideal market and should be rearranged forthwith.' 28 That the real world falls short may be regarded as a parochial irrelevance, for it is the 'perfect market', the 'market as ideal type', on whose behalf the claims are being made. Hampsher-Monk has a particularly ingenious response to this that I shall come back to later, but for the moment it is the general point that matters. Simply countering claims made on behalf of an ideal market with evidence of the deficiencies of actual markets will be derided as failing to understand the role of abstraction. When applied to egalitarian theorists who employ the hypothetical market precisely so as to highlight the imperfections of actual ones, it will be seen as entirely missing the point.
In what follows, I do not directly address claims about markets promoting equality (though it will no doubt be apparent that I am sceptical of such claims). My question, rather, is whether the turn towards the market exemplifies one or more of what I distinguish as three idealising moves. If so, can it be said to illustrate some of the problems with those moves?
The critique of abstraction
Though we owe much of the current language of ideal and non-ideal theory to Rawls, I start with a different literature (one that has been more formative for me) that centres on the abstractions of the citizen or individual. This is primarily a feminist literature - 29 The main argument here is that the abstraction fails in its proclaimed neutrality. The figure of the white male lurks behind the innocently depicted citizen, excluding or marginalising the racialised and gendered other.
In its origins, the abstract citizen or individual was entirely deliberate, and mostly well-intentioned. It was through differentiating what was essential from what was contingent that liberals and egalitarians were able to propose that we ignore social differences of wealth and status, overlook biological differences of ability and strength, and focus on what makes us all human, therefore deserving of equal respect.
But the representation of the individual, not just as disembedded (the communitarian critique) but also as disembodied (the feminist critique) meant that features historically specific to particular groups of individuals got tangled up in the supposed abstraction. Most notably, the individual was conceptualised in the image of the male:
the evidence for this, paradoxically, being precisely the extent to which the male body disappears from view. The male body becomes invisible as the taken-for-granted norm, while the female body (what Nirmal Puwar describes as the body out of place 30 ) carries a burden of doubt, is associated with difficulties and problems, is thought to require 'special' treatment or concessions, and generally lacks authority.
By the same token, those who constitute the dominant group have no racial or ethnic characteristics -they are able to figure simply as 'individuals' -while the racial characteristics of the rest become hyper-visible.
That this has happened is easy enough to establish: we need only trawl through classic texts in liberal and egalitarian theory. The more challenging claim is that it is impossible to construct disembodied conceptions of the individual without introducing some kind of hierarchy, or some version of an us/ them differentiation.
The claim here is that we cannot consistently think outside the constraints of lived, embodied, experience, and that somewhere along the line, particular kinds of bodies and particular kinds of people are going to enter into even the most abstract of conceptions. In any given society, there may be some abstractions we can genuinely manage: it might be, for example, that in a society where nothing at all attached to whether people believed in god or which god they believed in, we could construct an image of the citizen that in no way privileged one religious group over another. It might be (I find this even harder to imagine) that in some future world where nothing attached to gender, we would be able to talk of the rights of the individual or roles of the citizen without in any way conjuring up either a male or female norm. The notion,
however, that we can achieve the necessary distance simply by the act of abstractionsimply through the power of thought -is almost certainly mistaken. We live our lives as embodied individuals, and cannot so readily separate out mind from body. In the 'pure' model of economic theory -taken over, I would suggest, in much of the Rawlsian deployment of the market -this is not supposed to happen. Prices, for example, are not supposed to reflect the costs of production, and certainly not the intrinsic (or worse still, moral) value of a commodity, but simply the current equilibrium between supply and demand. There is no 'right' price. As Hayek put it, 'current prices… have no necessary relation to what has been done in the past in order much effort it took to produce a particular commodity, the good becomes worthless if no-one now wants it. If preferences change and demand collapses, so too will the market value. If demand rises without a corresponding increase in supply, so too will the price. Norms of fairness are not supposed to play any role in this.
But just as it is hard to imagine an individual without that individual assuming embodied form, so it is hard to conceive of market transactions taking place unmediated in any way by norms, codes, social conventions or expectations. notions as to what is a reasonable price for a particular good or service, or a reasonable wage for a particular job; and as feminists have commonly argued, this latter will often incorporate historically generated norms about men's and women's work. 35 Employers will commonly take account of prevailing norms in setting rates for a job, and suppliers will commonly take account of them in setting prices for services or goods. Representing these socially generated ideas of worth as external to the operations of the market -perhaps as historical contingencies, or leftovers from some pre-market past -simply presumes in advance that we can sensibly talk of a 'pure' market untouched by these.
In 'Economists Favour the Price System -Who Else Does?', Bruno Frey discusses the example of a Toronto hardware store that raised the price for snow shovels from $15 to $20 after a heavy snow storm, and was roundly condemned by paying a premium for their prejudices -employers paying more to have men working for them rather than women, for example, or shoppers paying more to buy their goods from white sales assistants rather than black. More precisely, the only reason why this could not happen would be if the preference for maximising one's money holdings always wins out over what we might term a preference for discrimination. Yet if we think of the preference for maximising money holdings and the preference for discrimination just as two different preferences -as the market model, with its supposed lack of interest in the nature of preferences, would seem to suggest -it is not obvious that we can assume that everyone wants the first. 'If it turned out to be empirically demonstrable that paradigmatically free markets did, as a matter of fact, erode discriminatory… preferences while sustaining narrowly 'economic' ones, this would, ironically, disprove the claim that the market mediated neutrally between participants' preference schedules.' 37 Either the ideal type of the market assumes that we will prefer money to our prejudices (in which case it has imported a substantive 37 Hampsher-Monk: 42 norm).Or actual markets actively encourage us to do so (in which case they cannot be neutral and agnostic between preferences).
Both Rawls and Dworkin rule out the impact of prejudice -Rawls through a principle of fair equality of opportunity, Dworkin through a principle of independence that rules out auction bids that fail to treat members of the community with equal concern -so my point here is not that either lacks the intellectual resources to challenge discrimination. The point, rather, is that markets cannot be conceived as neutral devices generating principles of equitable treatment when they operate through historically specific conventions and norms that may or may not (and this then becomes a historical, not conceptual question) promote equality. The relevance of this should become clear in my final section.
Rawls' contrast between ideal and non-ideal theory
In the figures of the individual and citizen, or the abstraction of the market as discussed above, the abstraction is not intended to carry any normative implications. It is 'ideal' simply in the sense of being an ideal type, supposedly stripped of contingency and accident. In Rawls' formulation, by contrast, ideal theory refers simultaneously to an abstraction from reality and to what is normatively ideal. Ideal theory is said to provide us with the principles of justice or morality appropriate to a world in which institutions and individuals already comply with the obligations of justice or morality. It deals, that is, with the principles of justice in a well-ordered society where 'everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his part in upholding just institutions'.
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The plausible object of this idealisation is to abstract from the effects of inequitable institutions or the problem of 'bad' people so as to focus our minds on what justice requires. So we would not, for example, ask what counts as a fair university admissions policy in a world marked by major inequalities of wealth (that being a problem for non-ideal theory), but would assume that the economic system was just, and focus on what ought in this context to be the procedures governing university admissions. We would not ask whether it was fair to require people to tell the truth when everyone around them is an expert in deception, but would work out the rules governing truth-telling on the assumption that everyone was complying with In discussions of the market, economists very commonly make a Rawlsian 'ideal theory' manoeuvre when they discuss the appropriateness of the price mechanism in such matters as reducing congestion on the roads or cutting carbon emissions. They assume, most notably, that the distribution of incomes is equal. They take the complications of income inequality out of the picture -in Rawlsian language, they assume compliance -and then consider the advantages of rationing through the price system against the risks of rationing through direct regulation. Under the assumption of equal incomes, the price mechanism always wins. It turns out to be fairer, more effective, better for the environment, better for everyone, to impose, say, a congestion charge on all cars entering a crowded city than to ration entry according to registration numbers, or increase subsidies on public transport, or build more roads.
To put a Dworkinian gloss this, those who really appreciate the privacy and convenience of a car, will be prepared to pay the premium, while those who attach more value to other things will happily travel by bus; neither envies the other's choice and there are fewer cars on the road.
The worried social critic then points out that incomes are not equal, and that congestion charges effectively deny access to motorists on low incomes while making the drive into the city a more delightful experience for those who can afford to pay. In my experience, the economist typically replies that this is a separate or subsequent matter, to be dealt with by some compensatory policy for the poorest, or through redistributive taxation. The point to note is that it is very rare for the complications attached to an unequal distribution of income to lead to serious reconsideration of the policy selected under 'ideal' conditions. If so, it looks as if the initial abstraction is not just simplifying the picture in order to clarify the issues at stake. It is loading the dice in favour of a particular solution.
In political, as opposed to economic theory, the tendency has mostly been in the opposite direction, with the market model abandoned or overridden at the point where its implications conflict with other moral intuitions. This makes it a lot more palatable -but leaves one wondering just how useful the hypothetical model has been.
Consider Dworkin's application of the hypothetical insurance model to health care.
He makes three idealising assumptions: that the resources people can command are as nearly equal as possible; that everyone has state-of-the-art knowledge about the costs and side-effects of particular medical procedures; and that no-one has access to information about the susceptibility of particular individuals to particular diseases.
With these assumptions in place, the market model is supposed to aid collective decision making about medical expenditure by modelling what choices prudent individuals would make if they knew they had to carry the costs of their choices themselves. Dworkin argues, for example, that very high levels of medical expenditure in the US reflect the fact that most decisions about the purchase of health care are made by patients and doctors, while the costs are borne by insurance companies, 'so that those who make the decisions have no direct incentive to save money'. 43 The object of the market model -and this is familiar terrain from neoclassical economics -is to promote decisions that more genuinely reflect 'what people would decide to spend on their own medical care, as individuals, if they were buying insurance under fair free-market conditions'.
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In his discussion of this, Lesley Jacobs has argued that it is impossible to say that health care decisions should reflect what well informed people, carrying the real costs of their preferences, would choose and that there should be universal access to health care. 45 The implication of the first, he suggests, is that even health benefits ought to be paid in convertible cash, and once that happens, it will no longer be possible to maintain a universal health service. There seem no good grounds, for example, for refusing the AIDS patient who says he prefers to take certain resources in cash rather than see the money spent on expensive medical equipment that might only marginally This is where an earlier point about needing to focus more on the substance of market relations rather than just general principles of market exchange becomes especially pertinent. There has been a lot of discussion in recent years about the narrow distributional paradigm of much contemporary egalitarianism: the tendency to theorise equality as a fair distribution of things, rather than as equality in 46 Dworkin Sovereign Justice: 361 47 One of the strengths of the alternative 'relational' approach is that it directs attention to the substance of market relations, focusing on the power hierarchies involved in particular wage contracts or the social disrespect involved in particular consumer relations, and arguing that these are as important in the delineation of an egalitarian society as the distribution of material resources. In the more abstract endorsements of 'the market', the nature of social relations, including whether they involve hierarchies of power, is less to the fore. While the average liberal egalitarian will readily abandon the market model when it leads to what she regards as unacceptable inequalities in distribution, she may not be so quick to notice unacceptable hierarchies of power or respect.
Ideal theory and the fact/value distinction
There is a third, looser, notion of ideal theory that comes into play when people say we need to work out the ideals of justice or equality -the dreams of paradise -before testing these against considerations of feasibility. The argument here is not that Yet when applied to the market, there are also problems here, for the separation between ideal and delivery can encourage a fact/value distinction that reinforces notions of the market as a relatively neutral tool. This, in a sense, has been the strategy of post Rawlsian egalitarians, who recommend leaving the market to do its work in generating the wealth, while drawing on ideal theory to identify the appropriate principles for taxation and redistribution. This is a clear implication of the now widespread compensation discourse, for compensation is usually understood as something that occurs after the event, and is therefore separated in time as well as conceptually from the process of wealth generation. It also tends to be the message of the alternative discourse of equality of opportunity, for example in Roemer's work, where the object of criticism is not so much the market system of rewarding occupations (which may simply reflect laws of supply and demand), but the tendency to reward certain types of people differently even when they have put in identical 49 Cohen 'Incentives, Inequality and Community': 329 amounts of effort. 50 For Roemer, the equalising adjustments are better timed before the event than after, for example, through hefty public spending on the education of those social groups whose efforts still leave them clustering in the ranks of the unemployed or lowest paid. But whether the language is of compensation or equality of opportunity, there is a tendency to separate out the norms that should regulate distribution and/or re-distribution from the practicalities that supposedly govern production.
Whether we can usefully separate out the principles that regulate production from those that regulate distribution has long been an issue in Marxist debate; and is part of what is currently at issue in arguments between distributional and relational conceptions of equality. The other main worry is that the separation understates the impact that living in a market society has on norms of fairness or equality, and presumes too readily that it is possible to pick out the 'good' elements of a market society while discarding or modifying the 'bad'. If the market is not, as I have suggested, simply an organising tool with semi-miraculous qualities of efficiency, but a set of institutions and conventions that embody their own norms, this 'pick and choose' approach to the market may not be so readily available.
Markets are only able to operate because of the codes and conventions that inform and regulate market behaviour. These conventions are not amoral, but likely, on the contrary, to involve particular norms, including particular understandings of desert. If so, then one of the major difficulties in welding strong conceptions of equality onto a market system of pricing and rewards is that markets may encourage precisely those notions of personal entitlement that egalitarians have been trying to challenge over the last three decades. In particular, the very experience of living in a market society may make the average citizen cling more firmly than ever to the notion that she does indeed deserve what she gets on the market. And the more we hear about the supposed fairness or neutrality of the market, the more convinced we may become that what falls into our lap by virtue of a relatively untrammelled market is, Marx argued in the Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875) that equal right can never be higher than the economic structure of the society in which it is formulated, and that in a society still stamped by its birth marks from capitalism, it will be impossible to think beyond the principle that regulates the exchange of commodities, the principle of exchanging equal for equal. This aspect of Marx's claim continues to ring true, for markets do seem to sustain a particular conception of equality, a notion of equality as getting back the equivalent of what you gave.
That focus on equivalence is one of the things Dworkin likes about markets, for it is said to force us to think about the 'real' cost of our choices, and real burden they impose on others, and weigh up whether a particular expenditure of effort or resources really is worth a particular outcome. Within the limits of this equivalence, it is clearly possible to think critically about how markets work: I am not offering a fatalistic argument in which no-one ever raises her sights above the limits of market exchange. As Frey's example indicates, non-economists tend to dislike the classically market ideal of suppliers rationing scarce goods by putting up their prices, while the average economist sees this as better than making people queue or issuing ration cards. If markets do promote and sustain particular understandings of fairness, it seems they can simultaneously sustain the non-economist's idea that prices should reflect costs of production (because consumers ought to pay suppliers the equivalent of what it cost them to produce), and the economist's idea that it is fair for suppliers to put up prices when shortages occur (because if people are willing to pay those prices, they must see the money they pay out as equivalent to the satisfaction they anticipate from the purchase). Note, however, that both these rest on notions of The third argument in favour of ideal theory is that maintaining a clear distinction between ideals and conditions of implementation helps immunise us against the tendency to reduced ambition. The distinction asks us to work out our values in isolation from, or at least prior to, addressing the facts, but in doing so, it encourages us to think of these 'facts' as having no normative content. Ironically, it then reinforces a tendency to think of the market as inherently neutral between different distributions of resources or different conceptions of the good, as something we can make use of for efficiency (and in Dworkin's argument, also equality) purposes without detracting from or reshaping our normative goals. My suggestion here is that markets do not just generate actual inequalities. The norms and conventions that constitute actual markets also generate understandings of and attitudes towards equality, inclining us to think about fairness and justice in particular ways. If so, it is unclear how useful it can be to construct ideals of justice or equality 52 G A Cohen (1994) 'Back to Socialist Basics ' New Left Review 207:9 in abstraction from the circumstances under which they are likely to be implemented.
The separation into two stages looks particularly problematic when it encourages representations of the market as a relatively neutral tool.
Conclusion
The rapprochement between egalitarians and the market might, in many ways, be taken as a counter-trend to the supposed dominance of ideal theory, indicating a concern with what is feasible, and a willingness to accommodate ideals to reality.
This would be a superficial interpretation. In any deeper sense, the flirtation with market metaphors and market models rests on a highly abstract understanding of 'the market'. In her defence of abstraction, Onora O'Neill distinguished between an idealisation that ascribes false predicates (thus clearly to be avoided) and an abstraction that brackets, rather than denying, certain predicates in order to achieve theoretical advance. 53 As she suggests, bracketing per se is unavoidable: any theory that tried to capture every detail of the phenomena it was analysing would be not a theory but a photograph (and as such, also selective and 'false'). But the bracketing required to produce the abstraction of 'the market' -like the bracketing required to produce 'the citizen' or 'the individual' -cannot be regarded as neutral in its effects.
It brackets off the norms and conventions that regulate the behaviour of markets, including substantive norms about what it is reasonable to pay people or what counts as fair exchange, and in doing so misrepresents markets as more even-handed between different reward systems than is the case. It also brackets off the distribution of income for later consideration. In doing so, it biases policy recommendations in particular -usually less socially ambitious -directions.
Few people today imagine solutions that disregard the market: pretty much all of us recognise that the societies we live in will continue to be organised on broadly market principles for as long as we can anticipate. What that means, however, is that differences between actual markets, between, that is, one kind of market society and another, become increasingly important in the formulation of egalitarian alternatives.
My argument, in this paper, is that certain idealised ways of talking about 'the market' do not help this process. The prospects for a more egalitarian, but still in some sense market, society must surely lie in differentiating more precisely the positive or 53 Onora O'Neill (1987) 'Abstraction, Idealisation, and Ideology in Ethics' in JDG Evans (ed) Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Problems (Cambridge University Press)
